To understand the meaning of Liberty Before Liberalism need from the classic essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," published in 1958. There, Isaiah Berlin said that political freedom can be interpreted either as negative freedom-that is, as non-interference ", as well as positive freedom, ie as self-government in general and how to directly participate in the sovereign power in particular- . He also explained, following the ideas that Benjamin Constant had developed in the essay "The freedom of the ancients compared with that of modern", that true political freedom is the freedom of modern refusal, resulting in the principle that person has the right to enjoy a sphere of fundamental freedoms that no individual, nor the State could violate. The ideal of positive liberty, Berlin warned, when it is conceived as a means of reinforcing negative liberty, but as an end in itself, has resulted in the most perverse forms of totalitarianism.
In sharp contrast, and purposeful, with the ideas of Isaiah Berlin, who have had and still have a huge influence on Anglo-Saxon political culture (and not just in this one), Skinner argues for its part that there is a modern conception of political freedom that is not identified, in fact, positive freedom and spreading before (and more valid) the idea of \u200b\u200bfreedom understood as the absence of impairment. While classical liberal theorists maintain that force, or threat of force "is the only form of coercion which interferes with the freedom of individuals, said Skinner, the English theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (which he calls Romanesque, since derived their ideas from Roman sources, although not all Republicans in the strict sense) emphasize that depend on the arbitrary will, even without knowing any interference, is a restriction of freedom of the individual.
For political theorists in his essay examines Skinner (specifically, James Harrington, John Milton, Algernon Sidney), the individual living in a situation of dependency - that is, it depends on the arbitrary will of another or other individuals, undergoes a constriction that prevents the exercise of their civil rights. Thus, the lack of freedom can come caused "by both the interference or dependence." This means, Skinner stressed that both liberals and neo-Romanesque and political freedom Republicans identified with the absence of coercion or interference, but the Romanesque, unlike liberals, consider the dependence on the will arbitrary other men as a serious form of coercion of the will. Well that despite Berlin, there are therefore two ideas of negative freedom: a freedom understood as non-interference, and the other as non-interference and dependence (1) .
To grasp the significance of Skinner's essay is, however, essential to bear in mind not only the intellectual context of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, but also the context of studies of republicanism. Unlike other scholars who have addressed the doctrine of republicanism as a political virtue (eg, John G. A. Pocock), Skinner has always interpreted republicanism as a theory of freedom. In his writings of the early eighties, Skinner argued that political writers Republicans and liberal theorists agree on the principle that being free means freedom from interference or constraints, but differ in relation to the political conditions that ensure freedom: while liberals argue that a constitutional monarchy can adequately protect the liberty of the subject, the Republicans insist that only a republic protecting liberty.
In Liberty Before Liberalism, Skinner, meanwhile, says, "and it is a significant revision, which is precisely the fundamental difference in the meaning of freedom. Political writers Romanesque, writes, refute "the central position of classical liberalism, that force or threat of force is the only form of coercion which interferes with the freedom of individuals." They maintain, however, that "living in a situation of dependency is itself a form of coercion." Skinner has changed his ideas, as he himself admits, also due to Philip Pettit studies, especially Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government . In this work, Pettit has shown that there is a difference between suffering a constriction and be in a situation of dependency. The first means that someone compels us to do something we do not want to do, or prevents us from doing something we would want to do and we are able to do, be dependent on means to live in a condition where someone can, if desired, to constrain something you do not want to do, or you can keep us from doing what we want to do and we are able to do.
A classic example of someone living in a situation dependence, which Skinner takes up and develops, is the slave or servant, even if your love is kind and therefore not press them, may at any time being oppressed because they depend on the arbitrary will of the master. Thus, the slave and servant are not free, even when they are oppressed and suffer no constriction. Republican Liberty says Pettit, is then, as liberal freedom, negative freedom. It differs, however, liberal freedom, since it says that being free means not only not be constrained, but not be dependent on the willingness of other individuals abitraria.
The reader interested in knowing the ongoing debate among scholars of republicanism can read through the "Postscript" of the second edition of Republicanism, Pettit disputes in which the absence of freedom is only in the dependence. And links interference, including interference and the constraints imposed by laws are not arbitrary, should be considered only as "secondary Offense Against freedom." Pettit, in other words, agrees with Skinner that republican liberty includes both the absence of dominance as the absence of interference, but maintains that the interference (including interference laws not arbitrary) is a restriction of freedom less significant than the rule. From my point of view, Skinner is right to emphasize that political writers neo-Romanesque dependence of the arbitrary will of a man or some men, is a form of severe restriction of the individual's will and as such, a violation of freedom. This interpretation of political freedom is the fundamental principle of criticism of the monarchy. If the King has discretionary powers which are beyond the control of Parliament and laws, impose their arbitrary will on the subjects, hence they are not free. Moreover, analysis of Skinner comes an aspect of the conception of political freedom that had been darkened in previous studies to Liberty Before Liberalism - that allows us to understand, however, the rationale for the reluctance of Republicans theorists item dependence. What makes the unit unacceptable is the fact that the unit generates fear people have arbitrary powers. Fear, in turn, produces a lack of spirit and courage that feeds servile attitude, it pushes down the hearing to remain silent or to speak to flatter the powerful. The situation creates dependency, thus a completely incompatible ethical spirit to mentality of the city, and therefore it must be fought as the most dangerous enemy of liberty. Who really has the heart of political freedom, we could summarize the argument presented by Skinner Republican, must combat both interference and constraint and dependency. However, it is important to stress that republicanism, unlike classical liberalism, does not consider the constraint as such, and in particular constraints imposed by laws that are not arbitrary, as a violation of freedom.
Republicanism has always been hostile to both the oppression and dependence as the license, understood as the freedom that is not tempered by laws. The Roman republican writers and his disciples, including studying Skinner, have never argued that true political freedom consists in the absence of interference, since they had the restriction or interference, which the law imposes on the choices of individuals by a limitation essential characteristic of republican liberty. Really considered the law as a public mandate and universal, also applies to all citizens, or to all members of the relevant group. This means that if scrupulously respecting the rule of law, no individual can impose their arbitrary will other individuals by virtue of the fact that no one can do away with acts that are prohibited on pain of punishment other. If, on the contrary, men, and not the law, those who govern, some individuals can impose their arbitrary will of others, oppress them and prevent them from pursuing the aims they wish to pursue, thus depriving them of liberty (and this is also valid in If either a majority of men that rule, that is, a democracy).
Machiavelli, to name one example, identifies the freedom of citizens to the restrictions imposed by law equally to all citizens. If a city is a citizen who fear the judges, and can therefore break the bonds of laws, he writes, the city is not free. In Istoria Fiorentine argues that "free call" only in that city in which laws and constitutional provisions restrict an effective way of 'cattivo umori "evil humors of the nobility and the people. And civil liberty means the absence of domination and dependence, "And certainly, if you consider the objective of high and low, will look at those big desire to rule, and in them the desire not only to be dominated, and therefore, a greater will to live free "(2) .
The argument that the rule of law is a necessary condition so that citizens are not subjected to the arbitrary will of some individuals (or single individual) and can therefore live free is a fundamental principle of republicanism, as can be seen well in critical Hobbes makes James Harrington, who had written that was not at all certain that the citizens of a republic of Lucca were freer than the subjects of an absolute ruler like the Sultan of Constantinople (3). According to Harrington, making the citizens of Lucca in individuals freer than the subjects of the Sultan of Constantinople is the fact that in Lucca both citizens and rulers are subject to civil and constitutional laws, while in Constantinople, the Sultan is above the law and may have abitrariamente of life and property of the subjects, and thus forced to live in a situation of total dependence and, therefore, absence of freedom. The citizens of Lucca, Harrington said, are free "by the laws of Lucca", because they are controlled only by the laws and the laws "are made by all with the sole purpose of protecting the freedom of each individual private, which eventually becomes the freedom of community " (4).
Skinner is a historian, as he reminds us at the end of the volume, but their studies we can draw important policy lessons for our time. Political morality can be obtained from Liberty Before Liberalism is that republicanism is, with respect to liberalism, a theory of freedom more consistent. The Republican argues that to say, in reality, political freedom must oppose both constriction interference and as such, as a dependency, given that the dependency is a constraint the will and therefore a violation of freedom. This means that anyone who loves true liberty of the individual can not cease to be liberal, but not be limited to liberal. It should also be willing to support political agendas that aim to reduce the powers imposed arbitrary live in a large number of men and women in a situation of dependency.
Classical Republicanism, and this is a point well in Skinner stresses Liberty Before Liberalism, to play a significant role in contemporary discussions should be presented as a critique of dependency and domination , not as a criticism of the links and the limitations to freedom of choice and should be clearly differentiated from both liberal intolerance in relation to the links as authoritative insensitivity to phenomena of domination.
Democratic societies are in need of moral and political language can persuasively illustrate the significance and value of civilian life with dignity. Republicanism has, from this point of view, credentials permitted, as long as they remain faithful to the aversion that fueled their teachers by tyranny and abuse. Although, compared with liberal freedom, republican conception of political freedom that highlights Skinner is more comprehensive, it is possible that promoted legislation to emancipate from dependence to some citizens impose on others in the practical restrictions on their freedom of action. Let us make reparation in some of the examples Pettit suggests the beginning of his book: a woman who may be abused by her husband could not resist or seek redress, a worker vulnerable to all sorts of abuse, small and serious, by the employer or superior, the elderly, the sick, lonely people who depend on charity. To free women from dependency is necessary to pass laws that secure conditions equality within the family, and to limit the arbitrary power of husbands to protect dependent workers is necessary to introduce laws to protect their physical and moral dignity, and to limit the arbitrary power of employers, to emancipate charity need to introduce taxes needed to ensure adequate social rights.
In all these cases, reducing the domination suffered by some citizens involves increasing restrictions of freedom (negative) of others, or better, to tie individuals were free to act at will . Sometimes it is not possible to reduce dependence without imposing links of the law. Whoever appeals to the republican tradition must choose policies that lessen the dominance, not those that try to mitigate their civic duties on behalf of the desire to be free of impediments. This does not really mean that Republicans should not see freedom as an absence of interference or absence of links, and not in any way mean that this freedom should be considered as a lower value freedom or dignity about freedom understood as the absence of dependence. It simply means that if for some freedom as absence of domination is opposed to freedom as absence of restraint or interference of others, the Republicans must put the absence of domination over the lack of interference, because this election is more in line with the ideal of the republic understood as a community of individuals in which nobody is obliged to serve and where you consent to any master.
analysis of Skinner can be derived, therefore, a second political moral: that the republican project of a society freed from dependency could also be an attractive prospect for the Liberals, provided they not restrict their own social philosophy within the limits of liberalism.
Notes:
1. Vid. Quentin Skinner, "Machiavelli and the Maintenance of Liberty ', Politics 18, 1983, pp. 3-15; "The Idea of \u200b\u200bNegative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives," in Philosophy and History , ed. R. Rorty, JB Schneewind and Q. Skinner, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 193 221 (English translation exists), "The Paradoxes of Political Liberty ', in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values \u200b\u200b, vol. VII, ed. SM McMurrin, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 225250. As a counterpoint, see what Berlin quoting Bentham writes: «Bentham, almost alone, doggedly went on repeating that the business of laws was not to liberate but to restrain: `Every law is an infraction of liberty' even if such `infraction' leads to an increase to the sum of liberty»: «Two concepts of liberty», en Four Essays on Liberty , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, pág. 148 (existe traducción castellana).
2. Istorie Fiorentine , IV, Proemio; Discorsi , I.5.
3. Leviathan , XXI.
4. James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics , ed. J. G. A. Pocock, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pg. 20.
